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Recent research has shown that observers store a vast amount of viewed real-world objects in
visual long-term learning with high precision (e.g., Standing, 1973; Vogt and Magnussen, 2007;
Brady et al., 2008), even when objects have been processed without any attention and intention
of learning (Kuhbandner et al., 2017). However, one open issue that has attracted considerable
attention recently is the nature of the stored visual long-term memory representations. Since
objects are higher-level constructs that represent patterns of lower-level features, two contrasting
views have been put forward: objects may be stored in in the form of sets of independent feature
representations or in the form of unitary feature-bound object representations (e.g., Brady et al.,
2013; van den Honert et al., 2017).
In two simultaneously published recent papers, contradictory conclusions are drawn. In a paper
by Utochkin and Brady (2020), the authors conclude that objects are stored as sets of independent
features, based on a series of experiments showing that object features are only weakly bound and
can easily be unbound in long-term memory, a conclusion which is also supported by a previous
study of Brady et al. suggesting that objects features are forgotten independently of each other
(Brady et al., 2013). By contrast, in a paper by Balaban et al. (2019), the authors conclude that objects
are stored as unitary feature-bound representations, based on a series of experiments following the
protocol of the study by Brady et al. (2013; Experiment 2) but analyzing the data with an alternative
analytical method, suggesting that object features are forgotten in a dependent manner.
At first glance, one could be tempted to conclude from such contradictory findings that further
research is needed to clarify which view is actually correct. However, there is another possibility that
is not considered in either of the two papers: it may be that visual information can be flexibly stored
in visual long-term memory both feature-based and object-based, depending on the requirements
of the current situation. If so, debates about whether visual objects are stored either feature-based
or object-based may be misleading. Instead, the relevant question that should be explored in future
research would be which factors determine whether objects are stored in visual long-term memory
feature-based or object-based.
Such a theoretical assertion is based on two assumptions. First, it must be the case that real-world
objects can be stored in visual long-term memory both feature-based and object-based. Second,
it must be the case that the different storage formats have different functionalities and can be
flexibly used. Regarding the first assumption, the contradictory findings reported in the papers
by Brady et al. (2013), Balaban et al. (2019), and Utochkin and Brady (2020) can be taken as
evidence that real-world objects can be stored both feature-based and object-based based. This
is also supported by the fact that both in studies examining feature memory (e.g., Magnussen and
Dyrnes, 1994; Magnussen et al., 2003) and in studies examining object memory (e.g., Ceraso et al.,
1998; Walker and Cuthbert, 1998), the existence of long-lasting memory representations has been
proven. The assumption that visual objects can be stored both feature-based and object-based is
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also found in prominent memory models such as the multiple-
entry, modular memory framework (Johnson, 1983), postulating
that there are feature-based and object-based memory
subsystems. Furthermore, the existence of qualitatively different
types of representational formats has also been recognized in
theories about the hierarchical structure of visual memory (for a
review, see, e.g., Brady et al., 2011). In fact, in research on visual
working memory, it has been shown that both feature-based and
object-based representations have to be assumed to fully explain
the observed performance patterns (e.g., Fougnie et al., 2010,
2013).
To shed light on the different functionalities of feature-based
and object-based memory representations, it is helpful to see how
real-world objects are initially represented in the cognitive system
during perception. Broadly speaking, two qualitatively different
processing steps are involved (e.g., Tarr, 1995; Riesenhuber and
Poggio, 1999; Serences and Yantis, 2006). First, visual features
such as orientation, colors, and so forth, are extracted from
the visual input, a process by which a representation of the
visual input in terms of a collection of independent features is
created. Second, informative features are recoded into bound
object representations and uninformative features discounted,
leading to the phenomenological experience of perceiving
coherent objects. Importantly, object representations are not
ad hoc formed independent of previous visual experiences.
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the two types of visual long-term memory representations. During perception, at an initial step, the visual input is represented in terms of a
collection of independent features such colors, orientations, and so forth. At a subsequent step, the features are recoded into bound object representations based on
already stored object templates that reflect the currently stored inner model of the structure of the world derived from previous experiences. The outputs of both
processing steps can be stored in memory, leading to unbound feature-based memory representations and to coherent object-based memory representations. From
a functional perspective, as long as the current inner model of the structure of the world is appropriate, visual experiences can be resource-efficiently stored as
coherent objects based on currently stored object-templates (“assimilation”). In situations where the current inner world model does not sufficiently represent the
incoming information, feature-based memory representation can be used to refine the current inner model of the structure of the world (“accommodation”).
Rather, the recoding of features is informed by a stored inner
model of the structure of the world that that reflects the
current visual knowledge about objects derived from previous
visual experiences.
As already postulated by Piaget (1970) and recently elaborated
in theories about the so-called predictive brain (e.g., Clark, 2013),
in order to allow adaptive learning, two opposing requirements
have to be met by our visual system. On the one hand, to
keep stability, incoming information has to be processed with
respect to stored inner model of the world (assimilation). On the
other hand, to allow adaptation, the current inner world model
has to be continuously updated based on inconsistent incoming
information (accommodation). The storing of feature-based vs.
object-based memory representations may serve the fulfillment
of these opposing requirements. As long as the current inner
world model is appropriate, it can be imposed on incoming
visual information so that visual experiences can be resource-
efficiently stored as coherent objects based on current inner
object models. Thus, object-based memory representations may
serve the function of assimilation. In situations where the current
inner world model does not sufficiently represent the incoming
information, the inner model itself has to be updated based
on the inconsistent information. In such a case, it would be
functional to store visual experiences in the form of feature
representations. Thus, feature-based memory representations
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may serve the function of accommodation (for an illustration, see
Figure 1).
Therefore, depending on the appropriateness of the current
inner model of the world, visual experiences may be stored either
as unitary feature-bound objects representations (assimilation)
or as independent feature representations (accommodation). A
recent study examining the effect of affective state on the storing
of real-world objects in visual long-term memory provides both
behavioral and neurophysiological evidence that this is indeed
the case (Spachtholz and Kuhbandner, 2017). As proposed in
prominent theories on affect-cognition interactions (e.g., Clore
and Huntsinger, 2007) and demonstrated in numerous studies
(e.g., Fiedler et al., 2003; Kuhbandner et al., 2009), affect signals
the validity of one’s current inner model of the world, with
positive affect validating and negative affect invalidating it,
with the consequence that positive affect triggers processes of
assimilation and negative affect processes of accommodation.
Consistent with this, when real-world objects were encoded while
experiencing positive affect, objects were more likely stored in
the form of feature-bound object representations mediated by
attention-related brain activities. By contrast, when real-world
objects were encoded while experiencing negative affect, objects
were more likely stored as independent feature representations
mediated by pre-attentive brain activities.
Evidence for the assumption that the nature of memory
representations is not unitary but a mixture of both feature-
based and object-based representations is indeed also provided
by the results of the studies by Balaban et al. (2019) and Utochkin
and Brady (2020). For instance, in the study by Balaban et al.
(2019), there is a number of memory reports where observers
remember one feature but forget another one, indicating that
memory representations are not purely object-based. Similarly, in
the study by Utochkin and Brady (2020), interference is observed
from irrelevant features when observers are asked to report
relevant features, indicating that memory representations are not
purely feature-based.
Taken together, the current state of research suggests that
visual long-term memory is not a unitary system that stores
real-world objects only in one specific representational format.
Rather, real-world objects can be flexibly stored both as sets
of independent features and as unitary feature-bound objects,
depending on the requirements of the current situation. In
particular, there may be a number of other factors beyond
affect that influence the way real-world objects are stored
in long-term memory. For instance, the storage format may
vary as a function of the amount of previous experiences
with encountered objects, making inner object models more
or less appropriate. Furthermore, similar to affective state,
current physical, motivational, and cognitive states may play
important roles, which have been shown to systematically
influence assimilation-accommodation tendencies as well (e.g.,
Leipold et al., 2014). At the interindividual level, individual
habitual assimilation-accommodation tendencies may influence
whether real-world objects are stored preferentially feature-
based or object-based, and it may even be that there are
cultural differences as suggested by studies showing that cultures
systematically vary whether local or global visual information
is favored during perception (e.g., Lao et al., 2013). Examining
such factors may be more fruitful than trying to determine
an illusionary unitary representational format of visual long-
term memory.
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